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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In 1968, according to the United States Brewers 
Association Almanac, each adult in the state of Montana 
consumed approximately thirty-eight gallons of beer.'*’
Yet, Montana, which is fourth in the nation in per capita 
consumption of beer, and which has some of the finest 
barley and clearest water in the United States, today lacks 
any malt beverage industry.
By tracing the history of the Billings Brewing Company, 
this thesis will attempt to explain why there is no malt 
beverage industry in Montana. This thesis will describe 
how some of the technological and economic developments of 
the Twentieth Century forced small brewers, like those in 
Montana, to give way to the large corporations. Therefore, 
this thesis is a history which parallels much of the late 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century America, when, be­
cause of economic changes, there occurred the rise of the 
monolithic corporation and the fall of the independent 
businessman.
■^•United States Brewers Association, United States 
Brewers Almanac, 1969 (New York: United States Brewers 
Association, 1969), p. 59.
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This thesis will also attempt to explain how the 
leadership of the Billings Brewery failed to realize, or 
refused to accept that the corporation was unable to com­
pete with large established breweries once technological 
changes occurred. As a result, the corporation almost 
became bankrupt.
It must be stressed that this case study only develops 
several conclusions which support several generalizations 
about both the large and small brewing industry. It attempts 
to do no more. Only with a complete study of all the myriad 
of problems faced by breweries which operated in Montana* 
and across the nation, can a definitive conclusion be 
reached on why they either succeeded or failed.
CHAPTER I I
1900 UNTIL PROHIBITION
Beer has been described as a ''universal beverage."^
The phrase is appropriate, for beer and the brewing art 
have been known to almost every civilization. In America,; 
when the earliest settlers arrived from Europe, they brought 
with them the knowledge necessary to produce a malt bever­
age.^ As the nation grew, so did the industry since a part 
of the European heritage included the production of malt 
liquor. Almost every city included a brewery among its 
notable edifices, while those urban areas with large 
ethnic groups, such as Milwaukee and St. Louis, became 
known as beer capitals. By the time of the Civil War the 
brewing art followed the footsteps of the settlers across 
the Missouri to the Pacific.
Montana's earliest history was not unlike the rest of 
the nation in respect to the brewing of beer. Those with 
available money and the knowledge necessary to produce malt 
liquor erected plants beside mining camps and near cattle
■^Stanley Baron, Brewed in America: A History of Beer 
and Ale in the United States (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1962), p . 3"I
^Baron, pp. 19 ff.
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trails. Residents of pioneer cities such as Butte, Helena, 
and Virginia City purchased local brew long before Montana 
achieved statehood. Few records remain to determine where 
in the Territory of Montana the first brewery existed, but 
Nicholas Kessler*s establishment at Last Chance Gulch, the 
present site of Helena, is considered to be one of the 
earliest. In 1865 Kessler bottled the malt beverage bearing 
his name.^
The building of the transcontinental railroads through 
Montana caused a rapid growth of towns and, similarly, an 
increase in the number of brieweries. By 1900 all the larger 
towns had imposing structures employing as many as fifty 
men. In fact, the state Bureau of Agriculture, Labor and 
Industry licensed twenty-one breweries to operate.^ Many 
of them failed almost immediately, for they had become too 
numerous to operate in the sparsely populated state. Never­
theless, in the years following statehood total beer produc­
tion increased as much <as twenty-five per cent, and in a 
1900 report by the state's industrial board breweries were 
acclaimed one of the most important industries in the state.
^Montana Record-Heraid, July 12, 1939.
^Montana Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, 
Eighth Annual Report 1901-1902 (Helena, Montana: State Pub­
lishing Company, 190 2), p. 384.
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The government publication praised Montana’s barley, a 
crop important in the production of beer, as so superior 
that ,in?<the near future Montana will be one of the 
chief beer producing states in the nation.”^ Such visions 
were not uncommon in the early 1900s. Several factors 
made the brewing of malt liquor a profitable business.
Taken together, they gave credence to those who saw beer 
as an important part of Montana’s future.
Foremost was the impetus-given to brewing by the 
influx of immigrants into the United States after the 
Civil War. Many naturalized Americans were well versed 
in the brewing art, and could offer both advice and ser­
vices to anyone wishing to build a brewery. Secondly, the 
process of brewing beer had not changed appreciably for 
many centuries. It was a relatively easy method to follow, 
and the cost was nominal.^ Since beer was an accepted
 5___________, Seventh Annual Report 1900-1901 (Helena,
Montana: State Publishing Company, 1901), p. 3 22.
6In the brewing of beer, a cereal grain, usually bar­
ley, is moistened and dried. Germination thus takes place, 
and the barley becomes malt. [Germination is a biological 
process]. Seeds spout and grow, depending on how much 
moisture is provided* The mixture is mashed and boiled 
with water, and for flavoring hops are included. Yeast is 
added, causing carbon dioxide and alcohol to form. Until 
recently, when breweries developed new processes, all 
formulas were almost identical. Lager beer, more common 
in America differed slightly. Yeast remains are left in 
the kettle and allowed to ferment a longer period of time.
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beverage, it was conceivable that to anyone interested in 
accumulating wealth, a brewery could be lucrative. Finally, 
small breweries were not,shackled by strong competition 
which became common following prohibition. Without the 
technological progress of the depression era, which caused 
a renaissance in brewing, and the advanced techniques in 
advertising so common today, small firms were able to pro-^ 
duce malt beverages on a competitive basis with establish­
ments in Milwaukee and St. Louis.
By 1900, then, the brewing industry played a prominent
role in the life of the state. Pure water and abundant
fields of barley were natural assets. Once a beer gained 
a following, its future seemed assured. Previously estab­
lished businesses such as Kessler's in Helena increased 
production while new brewing corporations built impressive 
plants housing the most modern equipment.
In the Yellowstone valley citizens became interested
in brewing almost immediately after the first settlers 
arrived. In 1882 the town of Coulson, approximately two 
miles east of Billings, offered the first site for a brewery. 
William Boots and George Ash built a brewery at Coulson
A stronger beer with a heavier taste is the result. Baron, 
pp. 14-18. A more detailed study of the science of brewing 
beer was compiled by Arnold and Penman as a tribute to 
modern brewing techniques. (John P. Arnold and Frank 
Penman, History of the Brewing Industry and Brewing Science 
in America [Chicago: G.L. Peterson, 1933 J)'..
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because of the town’s location--by the Yellowstone River.? 
Yet, Boots and Ash’s endeavor came to naught, for Coulson's 
population fell almost as rapidly as it rose. The brewery’s 
leaders saw an ever diminishing return on Boots Beer which 
depended primarily on local patronage.** The brewery failed 
along with the town of Coulson and both were soon forgotten.
The erection of a permanent brewery for the Yellowstone 
Valley remained to be built by a triumvirate from Butte-- 
Henry Mueller, Louis Best, and Phil Grein. It is fitting 
that citizens from the mining city conceived the idea for a 
brewery in Billings, since men from Butte controlled the 
brewery and its property for the next fifty years.
On February 13, 1900, Mueller, Best, and Grein met in 
Butte to organize the corporation.9 They had previously 
purchased 100 lots in Billings and had initiated construc­
tion of the building a year earlier. At the February
^Hardin Tribune, July 19, 1929.
**Boots and Ash used an ingenious method to uplife their 
ailing industry. A small streetcar line existed between 
Coulson and Billings and, as Billings grew, the brewery 
offered a free schooner of beer to 1 any adult riding the rail 
line to Coulson. Kalispell Times, April 7, 1938; Hardin 
Tribune, July 19, 1929.
^Director’s Meeting, February 13, 1900. Minutes, 
Billings Brewing Company, University of Montana Archives, 
Billings Brewing Company Papers. Hereinafter referred to 
as BBC, Minutes.
■^Billings Gazette, October 6, 1899. Hereinafter 
referred to as BG.
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meeting Mueller, Best, and Grein sold the property to 
the Billings Brewing Corporation for $100,000, and placed 
on sale 1,000 shares of stock for $100 each. Mueller and 
Best elected themselves President and Vice-President, while 
Grein assumed the position of Secretary-Treasurer.H  This 
triumvirate had a successful history in brewing beer. They 
could point with pride to past accomplishments, and could f 
look forward to a bright future in the Billings endeavor.
Henry Mueller, born in Cologne, Prussia, emigrated 
to America at an early, age. He worked his way West in 
mines, lumber mills, and factories. In 1885 Mueller arrived 
in Butte, where he secured employment as a bookkeeper for 
the Centennial Brewing Company, the largest in Montana and 
one of the finest in the Northwest . H  Mueller’s early know­
ledge of mining proved beneficial, for the claims he staked 
around the richest hill on earth provided him with the 
necessary capital to buy the Centennial Brewery when its 
owner, Leopold Schmidt, wanted to sell out. By this time 
Mueller was a highly esteemed resident of Butte and one of 
its most prominent citizens. Mueller promoted community 
organizations and served as County Supervisor, Mayor, and
^BBC, Minutes, February 13, 1900.
i^Helen Fitzgerald Sanders, History of Montana Vol.
Ill (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1913), p. 1303.
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Chairman of the School B o a r d . I t  was during Mueller's 
Presidency of the Centennial Corporation that he became 
closely associated with Louis Best, the brewery's Secretary- 
Treasurer. Best's vision and intuition involved both men 
in financial transactions which gained for the Centennial 
thousands of dollars worth of land as well as breweries 
in Anaconda and Billings.
Louis Best, born in Milwaukee, had been involved in 
the malt liquor industry for many years. His wealth was' 
inherited, for his parents were of the prominent Philip 
Pabst Best family, founders of the Pabst Brewing C o m p a n y . 14 
Best's knowledge of the brewing art gained a wide following 
of satisfied drinkers for the Centennial Corporation. He 
pressed Henry Mueller to invest in 100 lots around Billings. 
That purchase laid the foundation for the Billings Brewing 
Corporation and, though the brewery is forgotten, the 
rentals from that early acquired property still furnish 
stockholders with dividends.
Although Mueller and Best supervised construction of 
the new plant, they remained in Butte, leaving control of 
the brewery to Phil Grein, Secretary-Treasurer and Manager. 
Grein, like his partners, was well acquainted with the
■^Sanders, p. 1304.
■^Anaconda Standard, January 30, 1902.
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manufacture of beer. A native of Frankfort, Germany,
Grein worked in breweries at St. Louis until 1883 when 
he emigrated to Montana. . He found employment with the 
Anaconda Brewing Company, subsidiary of the Centennial, 
and remained there for seventeen years. Once the plant 
at Billings opened, Grein moved to the Eastern Montana 
city to lead the corporation.^-^
The brewery Grein managed was similar to other plants 
of the day. Resembling a massive dungeon with castellated 
cornices and arched windows, the brewery built the 
three-story complex to last a century. Described as an 
’’ornament to the city/’ the steel and brick structure cost 
an estimated $100,000.-^ The brewery’s machinery was the 
most modern of the day and was capable of producing 20,000 
barrels of beer each year.
Among the several rooms containing complex equipment, 
the most impressive to visitors was the cooling room and 
its ice machine. Brewery personnel considered the ice 
machine "one of the most complete in the West," for, 
through the system’s ammonia process, it was capable of
3-5BG, September 10, 1930.
16B(2, October 6, 1899. 
l^BG, October 6, 1899.
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manufacturing a six-inch cover of ice across its pipes. 
Besides a dozen brewing vats on the first floor, the plant 
included, on the second level, ten cold storage tanks which 
could hold 1050 barrels of beer at any one time.^ An area 
of preparatory equipment for brewing beer, notably cold 
water tanks and grain hoppers, covered the third floor.
Other wonders of the age of industry which visitors could 
marvel over included a "patent-filter" to remove visible 
impurities from the beer, an automatic bottle washer capable 
of cleaning sixteen bottles at one time, and "...a machine 
which will save no little amount of labor is the patent- 
corker. It is a self-feeder and corks a bottle after it 
has been filled,
In the warm spring days of 1900 the German immigrant 
brewmasters Paul Riedel and Ed Krause bottled the first 
gallons of Old Fashion Beer. Grein, in an effort to win 
adherents to Old Fashion as quickly as possible, inaugurated 
a well-financed campaign for business. As a gesture of 
good will, Grein formally opened the brewery by providing 
free beer. Workers, who had profusely decorated the building 
with flags and bunting, led residents of the Billings area
l^BG, February 6, 1900.
!9BGs February 6, 1900.
2^BG, February 6, 1900.
21BG, February 6, 1900.
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on a tour of the plant. A newspaper reporter estimated 
over 3,000 citizens attended the gala event. Persons 
claiming to be "good judges of beer" equaled Old Fashion 
to Pabst or Schlitz beers.22
Once Old Fashion reached retail markets, Grein adver­
tised his brewery's beer in newspapers throughout Eastern 
Montana and Northern Wyoming. Horse drawn beer carts f 
carrying Old Fashion to bars and saloons became as familiar 
as milk trucks. A beer bottle car promoted the brewery.^
Shaped and painted like an Old Fashion bottle on wheels, 
brewery employees drove the automobile around Billings 
claiming the local beverage was "the beer that made Mil­
waukee jealous."23 Newspapers reminded imbibers that the 
brewery's method of preparation "never causes b i l i o u s n e s s ."24 
A large electric sign displaying a bottle of Old 
Fashion pouring its contents into a mug added distinction 
to the building. The sign was ingenious but not practical 
for it was placed over a steam pipe on the brewery's roof, 
which caused the wires to short whenever condensation occurred. 
Also, the sign was built before neon and required two thou­
sand bulbs.25
22BG, April 17, 1900.
23BG, April 2, 1933. '
24Kalispell Times, September 5, 1940.
25BG, March 16, 1933.
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The breweryTs early success more than pleased the 
owners in Butte. Each week saw an increase in the number 
of kegs lining the street in front of the brewery where 
drivers loaded the beer on wagons and trucks. Mueller and 
Best planned to make the other property a profitable 
investment. On land immediately adjacent to the brewery
i
the corporation built a bottling plant and storage house.
On the same block the businessmen erected four warehouses, 
two sheds, and one home. These businesses were soon 
followed by several other money-making enterprises includ­
ing pharmacies, department stores, and lumber yards.^6 
Architects designed blueprints for a hotel next to 
the brewery using steam heat from the kettles to warm the 
rooms. A completely modern building for its day, the 
Gage Hotel increased the revenue of the corporation as soon 
as it opened because of the location--directly across the 
street from the Northern Pacific Railroad Passenger Depot. 
Three stories in height and fashioned of brick similar to 
its neighbor, architect specifications' noted the structure 
included skylights on the roof, oak flooring, concrete
^General Ledger, Billings Brewing Company, University 
of Montana Archives, Billings Brewing Company Papers. 
Hereinafter referred to as BBC, General Ledger.
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basement, kitchenettes, and water closets on each floor.27
In the years before prohibition breweries were not 
prevented from controlling bars. The Billings Brewery 
leased several lots to local citizens who opened taverns 
and saloons. In a short time bars owned or controlled by 
the Billings corporation sold Old Fashion on tap. Old 
Montana, Branch, Capitol, Little Terrace, and Buffalo Bill’s 
Rex, familiar names to early Billings residents, were off­
springs of the parent b r e w e r y . 28
The Billings Brewery Corporation was a business seem­
ingly destined to provide an eldorado for its owners. Yet, 
for all their endeavors, Mueller, Best, and Grein would not 
enjoy the fruits of their labor. In 1902 Best died of lung 
disease.^9 That same year Mueller suffered a stroke which 
prevented him from actively managing any of the Centennial 
interests. In 1908, Mueller, paralyzed and bedridden, 
passed a w a y . ^ 0  Thus, almost from the beginning of beer 
production, Grein assumed complete control of the Billings 
firm, and after 1902, its presidency. For Grein, the duties
2?General Specifications...Hotel Building... for Billings 
Brewery, University of Montana Archives, Billings Brewing 
Company Papers.
2^BBC, General Ledger, BĜ , April 2, 1933.
2^Anaconda Standard, January 30, 1902.
^Sanders, p. 1304.
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were too great a burden. Although only in his forties,
Grein suffered constantly from migraine headaches and 
could not devote all the energy necessary to the running 
of the corporation.31 The malady forced Grein, in 1908, 
to resign from brewery l e a d e r s h i p . 32
Regrettably, the new president designated by brewery 
stockholders, Joseph Collins West, lacked the interest and 
devotion to the brewery apparent in his predecessor. West, 
a graduate of Notre Dame, worked as a bookkeeper in Mueller's 
Centennial plant. His marriage to one of Mueller's daugh­
ters brought him into the wealthy family as a director of 
the corporation. In 1902, West moved to Billings as 
Secretary-Treasurer of the Billings plant, and assumed the 
presidency on Grein's r e t i r e m e n t . 33 West's cavalier attitude 
and myriad schemes at quick money ventures, including a 
bottling plant in Wyoming, sporting goods store, and real 
estate holdings, were promoted at the expense of the brewery.
In 1915, West quit the brewery to devote his full atten­
tion to other interests. Stockholders selected new officials. 
Art Trenerry, former brewery office manager, assumed the
31Under Grein profits continued to rise. The brewery 
produced 15,000 barrels of beer annually. Kalispell Times, 
September 5, 1940.
^BG, September 10, 1930.
33BG, July 22, 1926.
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presidency, while ex-clerk Raymond Wise succeeded to the 
office of secretary-treasurer. With their appointments 
Trenerry and Wise began a lifetime of service at the 
Billings Brewery. Much of the history of the brewery is 
an account of Trenerry?s leadership and perseverance in 
the production of Old Fashion Beer.
Trenerry, a native of Wales, arrived in Butte with 
his parents in the late 1800’s. Shortly thereafter, while 
employed as a bookkeeper at the Centennial plant, he became 
acquainted with brewery operations. Mueller and Best soon 
recognized Trenerryfs abilities and appointed him manager 
of the Butte plant. Trenerry assumed the same position at 
the Billings Brewery while West held control, and followed 
the latter into the presidency• when West left the business.34
Both Trenerry and West, as Grein before them, operated 
the business during auspicious years. In the days before 
prohibition sales and production increased annually. Be­
tween 1912 and 1915 profits on both barrel and bottle beer
3^BG, December 1, 196 2. Throughout his life Trenerry 
remained~"active in civic and social affairs. He was wor­
shipful master of the Elks, potentate of the Shriners, and 
ruler of the Masons. Trenerry served on the city council 
as well as civic projects. Trenerry was also an avid 
sportsman and supported all programs involving sporting 
events. Raymond Wise was born in Menasha, Wisconsin. In 
1906 he came to Billings and almost immediately began 
working, at nineteen years of age, for the brewery. BG, 
August 13, 194 5.
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rose from $31,324.67 to $51,100.48, or an increase of 
approximately 63 p e r  c e n t . ^5 In 1915, production reached 
an all time high with 16,072 barrels of beer f i l l e d . ^6 
The following year production again substantially increased 
to 19,463 barrels, and profits surpassed $57,000.*^
The 1916 profit, however, would never again be reached, 
for the brewery’s prosperous years under Trenerry were 
short lived. By 1917, the future presupposed prohibition 
and closure. The temperance movement which had begun years 
earlier with the idea of outlawing all liquor, had become 
national in scope with its own political party and spokes­
men among both Democrats and Republicans. Forces against 
liquor were well represented. The Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union, The Anti-Saloon League, and several 
religious organizations joined to lobby against liquor on all 
levels of government. Temperance forces gained a foundation 
for their program in the xenophobia of the First World War. 
The government closed all liquor distilleries as a wartime 
measure.^ Prohibitionists turned their attacks against
35profit and Loss Statements, 1912-1915, Billings Brew­
ing Company, University of Montana Archives, Billings Brew­
ing Company Papers. Hereinafter referred to as BBC, Profit 
and Loss.
•^BBC, Profit and Loss, 1915.
*^BBC, Profit and Loss, 1916.
^ F o o d  Control Bill of 1917.
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breweries. . They made it seem unpatriotic to drink beer by 
linking the brewery, and its owner, to Germany.
In Montana, as in all the other states, temperance 
groups petitioned for legislation to outlaw liquor. In 
the November elections of 1916, prohibitionists triumphed 
when citizens of the Treasure State voted for abstention.^9 
The adoption of prohibition in Montana allowed all breweries 
two years, until the end of 1918, to dispose of their stocks. 
Although the law was contested, breweries were not offered 
a reprieve from extinction, for the State Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of prohibition.40
Art Trenerry*s control of the Billings Brewery ended 
in February of 1919 when, after the court ruling, he directed 
brewery personnel to pour $11,876 worth of beer into the
3^For: 102,358. Against: 73,990. United States
Brewers Association, Yearbook, 1916 (New York: United 
States Brewers Association, 1917), p. 16.
^ I n  1917, the State Legislature approved an Enforce­
ment Act to dispose of all alcoholic beverages. Because of 
faulty wording in the Enforcement Act, i.e., "all liquor 
containing as much as two per cent alcohol by volume" was 
outlawed, the Centennial Brewing Company of Butte construed 
the words to mean any beverage with less than two per cent 
was acceptable. After selling their beer, and being fined, 
the brewery carried the case to court. The legal right to 
produce beer was not settled until the State Supreme Court 
voiced an opinion. In 1919, the judicial body declared pro- ' 
hibition was not enacted to regulate liquor, but to outlaw 
it. Therefore, they upheld the right of the state to close 
and fine the Centennial Brewery. State vs. Centennial 
Brewing Company, 55 Montana 500 (1919).
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sewer.41 Trenerryrs problems were further exacerbated by 
the corporation's other property interests. Trenerry 
closed the several bars owned by the brewery and disposed 
of their furniture and fixtures at a fraction of the cost. 
Some years later Trenerry wrote of his difficulties:
On January 20, 1920 we had 60 sets of beer 
fixtures on hand. They represented an investment 
of about $50,000. Some time later they were 
appraised for inventory at a book value of $150 
each. And of that lot we have only two left.
The rest were bought by restaurants, which cut 
down the bars and turned them into counter tops, 
or.to speakeasies. Of the latter, the majority 
were eventually confiscated or destroyed by
prohibition a g e n t s . 42
The brewery closed deep in debt. The value of the 
corporation fell by almost $100,000.43 jn 1919, the brewery 
ended production with a total loss for the brewery in ex­
cess of $74,000. Even with remaining property rents to 
offset the loss, the deficit remained a staggering $50,000.^ 
Brewery directors changed the name of the business to the 
Advance Manufacturing Company, and produced Tip Top soda 
pop in the bottling house.
Brewery employees accepted other jobs, or moved from
^BBC, Profit and Loss, 1919.
42BG, April 2, 1933.
4^BBC, Profit and Loss, 1919.
f
44b b c , Profit and Loss, 1919.
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Billings to be forgotten. Trenerry operated an insurance 
business and concerned himself with local politics while 
managing the defunct brewery’s property i n t e r e s t s . R a y  
Wise purchased interest in the Billings Coco Cola fran­
c h i s e . ^  Phil Grein, who regained sufficient health to 
return as brewery office manager prior to prohibition, 
operated the Gage Hotel and an ice company until 1930, 
when, after thirty years of illness, he committed suicide . ^  
Trenerry was fortunate that the 1920’s were prosperous, 
for he Used money from property rentals and other'investments 
to slowly eradicate the debt.^^ Stables and warehouses
^Trenerry served two terms as mayor of Billings--in 
1927 and 1929. In an interview with a reporter during his 
first term, Trenerry explained his hopes for Billings. 
Trenerry wished the city could buy ’’much needed street 
equipment.” His other hopes were to remove the city dump 
from its present location ne,ar the Northern Pacific Rail­
road tracks because it spoiled a visitor’s idea of what 
the area of Montana was like [Trenerry cautioned he was a 
"crank on cleanliness and invite you (public) to visit any 
of the departments, especially the city barns, where every 
stall is spick and span as it should be--horses clean and 
harness shining.”!; an incinerating plant, estimated cost 
$25,000; electric street signs (stop and go) $4,500 for six; 
athletic field, $10,000; and an air port--the cost of which 
would be $10,000. Midland Review, December 21, 1928.
i
^ B G , August 13, 1945.
^?BG, September 10, 1930.
48xrenerry invested rent from properties in eighty-four 
shares of U.S. Treasury Stock to offset the falling value of 
the corporation. BBC, Profit and Loss, 1920 ff. Breweries 
were not given any tax relief for obsolescence of equipment. 
One brewery protested all the way to the Supreme Court which
21
adjacent to the brewery became garages for truck transport 
firms and auto dealers. The Advance Manuafacturing Com­
pany converted empty bars into hardware stores, cafes, 
and a myriad of other businesses including a house of 
prostitution.49
For Art Trenerry, prohibition was a long nightmare. 
His life had been dedicated to brewing beer. Trenerry, -
along with numerous other operators of small plants waited 
fourteen years to fulfill that commitment. Regret ,
Trenerry could not realize that after repeal brewing be­
longed to the large corporations. Successful competition 
required modern techniques, but the small brewer's methods 
were as antiquated as his equipment. To Art Trenerry and 
men like him, this fact would not be apparent until long 
after the repeal of prohibition.
ruled against the brewery in Prohibition Cases 253, U.S. 350 
and Clark Collection vs. Harberle Crystal Springs Brewing 
Company 1930. SoIons ruled: "...when a business is extin­
guished as noxious under the Constitution, the owner cannot 
demand compensation from the government, or abatement of 
taxes...." The Anti-Saloon League, Yearbook, 1930 (West- 
ville, Ohio: The Anti-Saloon League*^ 1931) , p . 2lTl.
49]vjrs. Olive McDaniels operated a house of prostitution 
on brewery property for more than forty years. Mrs. McDaniels, 
whose business name was Olive Warren, listed her occupation 
as cattle rancher from Newcastle, Wyoming. Residents 
around Billings remember her "place" on Minnesota Avenue--The 
Lucky Diamond. In 1904 brewery journals list her house as 
an account. Mrs. McDaniels rented the Lucky Diamond until 
19 29, when she moved to the Virginia Hotel, converted from 
the Capital Bar to accommodate her trade. Mrs. McDaniels 
remained at the Virginia until her death in 1943. BBC, 
Journals, 1904 ff. BG, December 8, 1943.
CHAPTER H I
BEGINNING AGAIN, 1933-1941
The Billings Brewery’s efforts to resume production of 
beer after the repeal of prohibition revolved around its 
president, Art Trenerry. Trenerry, whose life became inex­
tricably bound up in the brewery, credited himself with 
being the only person having any real interest in the 
insolvent corporation.-*- Without owning stock in the firm, 
Trenerry accepted responsibility as manager when the general 
public considered brewing a liability as a business. In 
the 1920’s he stubbornly persisted in the belief that pro­
hibition would end, and he would again lead the corporation.
Trenerry!s resolve was an asset for stockholders during 
prohibition, since without his perseverance the corporation 
would probably have ceased to o p e r a t e . 2 After 1933, however,
In a letter to one of the stockholders, Trenerry re­
lated his bitterness on having taken control only to face 
prohibition. Written in 1924, Trenerry indicated his feel­
ings about running the defunct brewery: ,fI am the only
employee left in the concern and I alone am responsible to 
the stockholders. I know [Ray] Wise uses the word "we” quite 
a number of times, but the affairs are being taken care of 
by myself...." Letter, Art Trenerry to Harry Kessler Jr.,
Dec. 4, 1924, University of Montana Archives, Billings Brewing 
Company Papers. Hereinafter referred to as Letter. ... BBC.
^ F e w , if any, of the original personnel associated with 
the brewery remained.
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Trenerry's stubborness was a liability. His interests so 
paralleled the brewery that he took any criticism of its 
operation as a personal affront. He steadfastly refused 
to believe the brewery could ever fail again. To this end 
Trenerry operated the business without facing reality. In. 
his mind, the brewery had to be considered a completely 
successful enterprise. To make sure stockholders accepted 
this premise, he paid dividends even when the brewery 
operated at a loss. A majority of the stockholders never 
bothered to attend meetings. Trenerry gladly paid dividends 
so they wouid not question his leadership or the brewery's 
solvency. As long as everybody was happy, Trenerry reasoned, 
no one would worry about problems which might arise.
Trenerry1s plan worked for a number of years, but 
eventually he was forced to extreme positions in explaining 
away the Billings Brewery's difficulties in selling beer.
This situation came about primarily as a result of diverse 
changes within the national brewing industry which ultimately 
forced many small malt beverage producers, including the 
Billings Brewery, into bankruptcy or abandonment of beer 
production.
Foremost was the effect of prohibition. While Art 
Trenerry struggled to pay off company debts from 1919,
^Within three years after the resumption of beer pro­
duction Trenerry used income received from beer sales and 
rental properties for dividends.
I
!
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national breweries, also forced into other business enter­
prises, produced numerous products --some of which were only 
remotely connected with beer. Anheuser-Busch of St. Louis, 
for example, manufactured everything from refrigeration 
units to yeast/ Schlitz of Milwaukee produced corn syrup, 
while the Pabst Corporation, also of Milwaukee, sold c h e e s e . ^  
Once prohibition ended, large Eastern breweries looked at 
beer as only one among many profit-making enterprises. To 
gain new markets Eastern firms slashed prices on beer using 
profits in other interests to offset any losses.^ The effect 
was detrimental to the small brewery whose existence depended 
only on beer.
Another change important to the brewing industry was the 
enactment of new laws to regulate the production and dis-
In 19 26, Anheuser-Busch began manufacturing yeast in 
a concentrated effort to win the trade from Fleischmann’s 
Margarine and Yeast Company, then producing ninety per cent 
of the yeast in the United States. In one month Busch sold 
700,000 pounds. By 1927 the corporation had erased a 
$2,500,000 debt incurred in 1919, and by the end of pro­
hibition Anheuser-Busch sold thirty million pounds of yeast 
annually. ’’King of Bottle Beer,” Fortune, July, 1935, 
pp. 42 ff.
cJThomas C. Cochran, The Pabst Brewing Company (New 
York: New York University Press, 1948), p. 345.
^When Anheuser-Busch again brewed Budweiser beer, the 
corporation gained control of numerous markets by selling 
beer at a lower price than the competition, and absorbing 
the loss with profits from yeast. ’’King of Bottle Beer,” 
p . 42 ff.
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tribution of beer. Individual states controlled breweries 
with stringent laws unknown before 1919. In Montana, the 
1933 Beer Act made breweries responsible to a new State 
Liquor Control Board which dispensed all distilled alcoholic 
beverages through a monopolistic state liquor store. Al­
though the board did not sell malt beverages, beer manu-
{facturers, wholesalers, and retailers were required to 
purchase a license from the state.? Producers also had to 
present the Liquor Board with monthly statements on the
iamount sold and were required to offer financial records 
for the board's inspection at any time.**
The state also placed restrictions on the brewer's 
methods of management. Before 1919, many malt beverage 
producers, like the Billings Brewery, controlled bars and 
saloons, and sought additional markets through liberal 
favors to retailers. In 1933, the Montana Beer Act outlawed 
the right of breweries to own bars, supply signs and mer­
chandise, or perform other gratuitous services for distribu­
tors and retailers. In addition, the new law ordered the 
State Liquor Board to limit the number of bars operating in 
any one area, and granted the board the privilege of revoking 
a brewer's, wholesaler’s, or retailer's license if any
^Cost: Brewery $750.00; Wholesaler $300.00; Retailer
$200.00. Montana Beer Act, 1933, Section 45.
^Montana Beer Act, 1933, Section 45.
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discrepancy occurred.^
A third broad trend was increased federal and state 
taxes after repeal. Before the First World War federal 
duties on beer averaged one-dollar and fifty cents for 
each thirty-one gallon keg.^-^ In 1933, the tax on the 
same amount of beer rose to five dollars. ̂  A brewer paid 
approximately six cents for federal taxes on each gallon 
of beer. This tax adversely affected small breweries which 
were unable to expand. A small brewery, which produced 
only several thousand gallons of beer each year, could not 
appreciably decrease production costs since it purchased 
only a limited amount of material at any one time. Large 
plants with money for expansion tripled or quadrupled 
production over a several year period. . This, in turn, 
lowered production costs and thus offset any increase in 
taxes. The limited size of a small firm prevented a 
decrease in the cost of production when the government 
raised taxes. In the case of the Billings Brewery, which 
could not keep production costs down because of a decline 
in sales, the increase in taxes only exacerbated their 
problems.
^Montana Beer Act, 1933, Section 2815.51.
•^United states Brewers Association, Almanac, 1969.
■^Cullen-Harrison Act.
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States levied a tax on the beer as well. In Montana, 
the 1933 duty amounted to eighty-six cents on each keg.12 
Although much less than the federal tax, this duty also 
proved to be an additional strain on the Billings Brewery*s 
already marginal profits.
A final change detrimental to the beer industry was 
the increased sales of soft drinks. During prohibition, / 
soft drinks expanded into almost every community, often 
times with the blessing of breweries which converted to - 
the manufacture of non-alcoholic beverages during the 
1920vs. In 1933, soft drinks were a billion dollar 
industry vying for a large share of the beverage buying 
public.
The results of these four changes were readily appar­
ent. While national,corporations with abundant cash 
readied their plants for the eventual day of repeal, small 
breweries, lacking capital, faced heavy outlays to make 
their equipment operable and begin production. Consequently, 
on April 7, 1933 when Franklin Roosevelt signed into law 
the Cullen-Harrison Act repealing prohibition, less than
Profit and Loss, 1933 foreward.
13p0r example, Coca Cola profits rose from $5,000,000 
to $26,000,000 between 1919-1929. E.J. Kahn, The Big 
Drink (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 60.
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75 per cent of the breweries operating in 1918 were able 
to reopen. From April 7 forward, Eastern plants counted 
increases in sales by hundreds of per cent.15 jn Billings, 
Art Trenerry readied for a stockholder's meeting to discuss 
changing the name of the Advance Manufacturing Company back 
to the Billings Brewing Company and consider the possibility 
of borrowing $35,000 to make the plant operational.^ Dur­
ing prohibition the brewery was used as a warehouse. In 
July, 1931 the third floor collapsed precipitating an f 
avalanche of thousands of sacks of beans to the floor below.
Supports for the second floor cracked under the strain,
1 7finally coming to rest on the beer vats. As a result,
14jn 1918, 1100 breweries operated. In 1933, 750 re­
opened. "King of Bottle Beer," p. 64.
■^Exactly at midnight, on April 7, 1933 Anheuser- 
Busch began brewing Budweiser Beer on a 142-acre site in 
St. Louis. "King of Bottle Beer," pp. 42 ff.
■^Stockholder's Meeting, May 25, 1933; Board of 
Director's Meeting, June 5, 1933, BBC, Minutes.
1?BG, July 6 , 1931. At the time Trenerry was repairing 
the brewery, the Billings City Council passed an ordinance to 
control beer which was similar to the state law. One pro­
vision of the law set fees of $750 annually for breweries to 
operate in the city. Trenerry appeared before the council to 
protest. He threatened to halt repairs on the brewery, claim­
ing it was impossible to compete with Eastern firms, and stated 
it would be cheaper to apply for a wholesaler's license and 
sell Eastern beer than to re-open the brewery. The closure of 
the plant, Trenerry added, meant a loss to the city of an 
$800 a week payroll. Although some members of the council felt 
the fee was not as detrimental as Trenerry believed, a week 
later they reduced the charge to $500 which seemed to bring an 
end to the controversy. BG, April 11, 1933; April 19, 1933.
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Trenerry had to renovate not only idle equipment, but also 
replace or repair walls, floors, and the all important 
beer vats.
By the time Old Fashion Beer reached the market in the 
fall of 1933, Trenerry’s original estimate for repairs 
proved to be wishful thinking, for he found it necessary to
1 oborrow $107,000. The loan was an expensive burden for ! 
the small corporation. Because of Trenerry’s .use of profits 
from beer sales and property rentals for dividends, he was 
unable to repay the debt until 1942.
Trenerry’s other hopes also proved to be illusionary.
He originally estimated the plant, in 1933, would ’’not 
exceed” the production of 20,000 barrels of Old Fashion 
B e e r . T h e  initial sales, although good, fell far below 
expectations. In 1933 the brewery produced only 4,450 
barrels, and after one full year of operation, less than 
16,000.^9 This was a particularly poor showing since the 
beer was well advertised in newspapers, on radio, and on 
billboards as a ’’home product carefully brewed for home 
use .” 21
^ S t o c k h o l d e r »s Meeting, June 3, 1935, BBC, Minutes.
19BG, March 16, 1933.
20BBG, Profit and Loss, 1933; 1934'.
2lAlso, it must be remembered that legal beer and drink­
ing in bars was a unique experience for many Montanans, 
which should have generated more interest than that which 
was shown in Old Fashion Beer.
31
In April of 1935, to acquaint the public with Old 
Fashion Beer and the brewery, Trenerry held an open house 
to observe the brewery’s thirty-fifth anniversary. The 
reception included free lunch and beer, and appeared to 
have been a great success with attendance in excess of 
10,000 p e o p l e . 22 Nonetheless, the promotion had little
Claims, which some may consider ridiculous, were made 
to promote Old Fashion Beer. In the spring of 1934 a 
Billings weekly, The Midland Review, published a series of 
half-page a dv e r t i s erne n t s proclaim!ng the benefits derived 
from drinking the beer. Two, among many, described the 
medicinal qualities:
It takes nerve. Men and women of today need nerves of 
steel. Whether their occupation is piloting an airship, 
controlling business, or directing household or social 
activities. When the nerves began to show an evidence of 
weakness prompt attention should be taken to restore them 
to a normal condition. Old Fashion Beer. As a food to 
tired, weak, overwrought nerves it has long been recognized 
in the medical world, because it is free from drugs--a 
wholesome strengthening tonic. Its natural food and tonic 
properties goes directly to the source of the trouble, 
soothing the nerves and helping to restore them to a strong 
healthy condition again.
Good health demands sound sleep. When nights are one 
continuous act of tossing, turning, dreaming--when nightmares 
haunt the hours of rest and mornings find you tired, and 
drowsy, and lacking ambition, its time to come to nature’s 
aid and drive away the cause of insomnia. Prompt relief is 
assured by the use of Old Fashion Beer. Brings roses to the 
cheeks. Makes blood and tissues, soothes, quiets, and 
strengthens the nerves, and is highly recommended in many 
cases by eminent physicians. A 3.2 beverage, manufactured 
right here in Billings for your own consumption.
22b g , April 14, 1935. The party proved to be more than 
a ’’reception.” After several hours of imbibing, the crowd 
became so "unruly” it was necessary to call four policemen 
to restore order.
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effect on beer sales, for, by the end of 1935, the brewery 
had a surplus of unsold beer on hand and production had 
dropped 15 per cent from the preceding year.23
Such indications of difficulty should have generated 
enough concern that the management would suspend stock 
dividends. Instead, Trenerry stated that business was 
improving and the future appeared bright. Amid Trenerry’s 
optimistic s t a t e m e n t s ,24 the stockholders finally asked for 
a return on their investment. In 1936, Trenerry and Wise 
acquiesced and offered a 15 per cent dividend at the end 
of the y e a r . 25 Trenerry, in agreeing to the dividend, 
followed his policy of presenting the brewery to the stock­
holders as a successful business. His actions were com­
pletely unjustified.
The true financial picture was not the bright future 
which Trenerry envisaged. Production again decreased because 
of a drop in s a l e s . 26 As a result, between 1934 and 1936 
production costs increased sharply, which reduced profits on 
both barrel and bottle beer. Profits on. each thirty-one
^BBC, Profit and Loss, 1935.
74Stockholder’s Meetings, June 1, 1934; June 3, 1935, 
BBC, Minutes.
25stockholder and Board of Director’s Special Meeting, 
December 12, 1936, BBC, Minutes.
^BBC, Profit and Loss, 1936.
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gallon barrel decreased from $2.57 to $1.17, while on 
bottle beer profits dropped from twenty-nine cents to two 
cents per case.^ Harold Godfrey, a Billings accountant 
who audited the brewery's financial records, warned of the 
necessity of decreasing operating expense and increasing 
working capital, but Trenerry remained unmoved.28
In 1937, the reality of the corporation's precarious 
position became apparent. Production costs increased more 
than 20 per cent over the preceding year. Both barrel and 
bottle beer cost more to manufacture than the price received 
from wholesalers. The corporation faced its first year in 
the red with a $14,000 l o s s . Trenerry explained the loss 
to stockholders in terms of a recession in the economy, 
and unfavorable weather conditions which adversely affected 
beer s a l e s . ^0 Despite the $20,000 he still owed on the 
1933 loan, Trenerry borrowed an additional $15,000 to pay 
the previous years dividend.^ More realistically, Trenerry 
also blamed the loss on the "novelty" of liquor by the 
drink in bars, and the "inefficiency and derelictness of the
27BBC, Profit and Loss, 1934, 1935, 1936.
28BBC, Profit and Loss, 1934, 1935, 1936.
29b b G, Profit and Loss, 1937.
^stockholder's Meeting, June 6 , 1938, BBC, Minutes.
•^Stockholder's Meeting, June 7, 1937, BBC, Minutes.
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Montana Liquor Control Board" for its inability to control 
violators of the 1933 Beer Act.^2
The "inefficiency and derelictness" to which Trenerry 
alluded, was the result of a corrupt State Board of Equal­
ization which was responsible for the liquor board and 
enforcement of the law. The board was one among several 
state agencies dependent on political patronage for its 
membership. During the 19 30's "...incompetent, chronically 
drunk, and corrupt officers" directed its o p e r a t i o n s . ^3 >
The inability of state officials to suppress violators, 
coupled with demands by bar owners to sell distilled liquor, 
ultimately resulted in the Liquor by the Drink Act of 1937.
The board still purchased all liquor sold in the state, but 
bar owners were given the right to buy distilled alcohol 
and wine from the board and sell it to the patrons. The 
reintroduction of hard liquor in bars exacerbated the problems 
of the Billings Brewery. Competition after 1937 included 
both rival beer and distilled spirits.
“̂ S t o c k h o l d e r ’ s  Meeting, June 6 , 1938, BBC, Minutes. From 
1933 to 1937 it was illegal to purchase whiskey or other dis­
tilled spirits except at State Liquor Stores. However, viola­
tions were numerous. Liquor inspectors "...found it nearly 
impossible to stop bartenders from selling liquor [illegally]." 
Gambling and prostitution flourished in many bars, and the 
owners' licenses were usually renewed even when he may have 
been arrested for violations of the law. Larry D. Quinn, 
"Politicians in Business: A History of the Montana State 
Liquor Control System 1933-1968" (Ph.D. dissertation, Univer­
sity of Montana, 1970), pp. 57-72.
^^Quinn, "Politicians in Business," p. 70.
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Liquor by the drink ended only one violation, among 
many, which surrounded the beer industry. Although Trenerry 
condemned the liquor board for its "derelictness" in 
suppressing violators, he was equally as guilty. Because 
of strong competition from large breweries, and the con­
tinued loss in tap beer sales to bars, the brewery began a 
campaign to win distributors by whatever means were avail-/ 
able.34
In violation of the 1933 Beer Act, Trenerry furnished 
signs, bar equipment, and fixtures to dealers throughout 
Old Fashion’s areas of distribution. In one instance, he 
allowed John Klamm, a bar owner from Miles City, to charge 
over $1,000 against the brewery in order to buy the necessary 
materials to continue o p e r a t i o n s . ^  Goodly quantities of 
Old Fashion were also freely supplied private clubs, unions, 
and fraternal organizations in an effort to win new cus­
t o m e r s . ^  Trenerry admitted that the policy was "not to 
our liking..." but necessary, since other breweries initiated
3^By 1937, sales decreased more than 37 per cent since 
repeal. BBC, Profit and Loss, 1933-1937.
Letter, Billings Brewing Company to John Klamm, 
November 4, 1941, BBC.
^ T h e  brewery received letters from unions, fraternal 
organizations, private businesses and various individuals 
thanking the brewery for supplying free beer for their 
parties, socials and meetings. [See General Correspondence, 
Billings Brewing Company, University of Montana Archives, 
Billings Brewing Company Papers].
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similar programs.3? Trenerry's relationship with beer 
dealers provides another example of his unorthodox efforts 
to insure continuous sales. He often carried accounts 
with beer dealers who were most negligent in paying their 
bills. Some registered outlandish accounts, yet continued 
as Old Fashion distributors because the brewery feared the . 
loss of even a single wholesaler in an ever-diminishing 
beer market. 38 For example, H.H. Chesterfield of the 
Roundup Montana Creamery owed more than $ 1,60 0 to the '•
brewery. Ray Wise implored Chesterfield to settle his 
account, and did receive nominal payments. Yet, the 
brewery continued to supply beer on credit so the bill 
remained well above $ 1 ,000.39
^^Stockholder's Meeting, June 6 ,  1 9 3 8 ,  BBC, Minutes.
3&Anton Koch, a bartender from Ingomar, Montana, bor­
rowed from a bank to pay his past accounts. Within a year 
Koch fell behind in his bank payment and, at the same time, 
was unable to pay for the new beer he ordered. Letter, 
Billings Brewing Company to Anton Koch Jr., January 6 ,
1 9 4 0 ;  Letter, Security Trust and Savings Bank to Billings 
Brewing Company, January 6 ,  1 9 4 1 ,  BBC.
39 Wise, in one of his pleas for payment from Chester­
field, reminded "Chet” of the brewery’s precarious position. 
Wise stated he was "put in a rather ticklish and embarras- 
ing situation" when government investigators perused the 
brewery's financial records and found Chesterfield owing 
$ 1 , 7 9 6 . 9 5  as compared to the previous balance, a month 
earlier, of $ 1 , 6 4 0 . 5 3 .  Wise warned Chesterfield "Whether 
or not you realize what that means, I do not know and I do 
not have the inclination to put all the details down on
paper. But it does mean this, that you simply must get
37
Violations of the beer act, carrying orders from one 
year to the next, and other practices were certainly not 
the exclusive activity of the Billings Brewery. Most 
small producers found it difficult to sell beer because of 
the c o m p e t i t i o n . T h e  Billings plant was no more, or 
less, guilty of violations than other firms.
When the Missoula Brewing Company lowered prices on 
beer in Roundup, Montana, the action precipitated an ex- / 
change of letters between Art Trenerry and William Stine- 
brenner, president of the Missoula plant, which helps 
explain the lengths to which the Billings Brewery went in 
an effort to win distributors. In a letter dated Septem-
this account down by June 15th or all of our *good reasons1 
given to the government man will be in vain." Letter,
R.H. Wise to H.H. Chesterfield, June 9, 1939, BBC.
40yiolations were so numerous among breweries that in 
May of 1940 J.E. Ericson, of the liquor board, sent letters 
to all brewers and wholesalers advising them that "...in 
the future all violators of this law [Beer Act Section 
2815.51] will be prosecuted without further notice."
Letter, J.E, Ericson to Billings Brewing Company, May 29,
1940, BBC. In 1941, the liquor board, after consultation 
with the stateTs Attorney General, ruled that neon signs 
were not in violation of the law since they were not used 
to dispense beer, and were not considered furniture.
Letter, J.S. Benjamin to Billings Brewing Company, Sept­
ember 29, 1941, BBC. In that same year the Montana License 
Liquor Dealer?s Association proposed to amend liquor and 
beer laws by adding a fair trade provision "...to curb a 
condition of price cutting that is getting out of hand to 
the damage of the retail liquor industry, and, we believe, 
to the detriment of the manufacturing end of the business." 
Letter, G.J. Zook to Billings Brewing Company, January 20,
1941, BBC.
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ber 8 , 1 9 3 9 ,  Trenerry noted that Missoula beer was selling 
for only sixteen dollars a barrel in Roundup. He went on 
to warn Stinebrenner:
Now supposing, Bill, this information gets 
around Missoula and other points that you are 
selling beer at Roundup for $ 1 6 . 0 0  while at 
Missoula and other points you are getting 
$ 1 6 . 5 0 . . . . You will immediately realize what a 
victim of circumstances you would be and all 
the alibing you would want would not be worth 
a tinkers damn4^
Stinebrenner sidestepped Trenerry’s threat in a return 
letter, and alluded to the problems faced by small brewers
ieverywhere.
Frankly, we sell little draft beer in the 
Roundup territory. Up to a short time ago, we 
had a customer over there that was using three 
and four half-barrels a week, but we lost this 
account to someone who painted his building for 
him. I understand he is now handling Billings 
and Sheridan Beer.
It is very unfortunate that tactics like 
painting buildings or giving away a half-barrel 
or case now and then, which seems to be the 
tactics that some of our good friends are doing, 
must go on.
However, it looks like it will be a hard 
thing for you and I to straighten o u t . 42
Stinebrenner added that brewers "could write volumes on
what is going on,'1 and questioned how some beer distributors
could stay in b u s i n e s s . 43 H e  concluded that some jobbers
41-Letter, Art Trenerry to William Stinebrenner, Sept­
ember 8 , 1 9 3 9 ,  B B C .
42Letter, William Stinebrenner to Art Trenerry, Sept­
ember 1 0 ,  1 9 3 9 ,  B B C .
4^Letter, William Stinebrenner to Art Trenerry, Sept­
ember 1 0 ,  1 9 3 9 ,  B B C .
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survived because ’’these give-aways and painting expenses, 
etc. are absorbed by the brewery. •
Costs for merchandise, and ’’painting expenses etc.” 
were absorbed by the brewery, and were reflected in general 
costs and sales. Between 1936 and 1937 both increased more 
than 25 per cent.45 This increase, along with a continued 
rise in the cost of production, priced the beer well above' 
the going rate. In order to sell Old Fashion in 1937, 
the brewery lost $1.26 on each barrel, and twenty-three 
cents oh every case of bottle beer produced.46 From 1938 
through the beginning of the next decade, returns were so 
small that it became unprofitable for the brewery'to 
operate.
Trenerry's action, in providing equipment to whole­
salers and retailers., was the culmination of frustrations 
and difficulties faced by a small brewery. These frustra­
tions- -dwindling profits, loss in sales, higher production 
costs--led breweries into a desperate fight for survival. 
Yet, these difficulties were the result of a technological 
revolution in the mass production and distribution of 
beer, which few small breweries could control.
44lbid.
4 sBBC, Profit and Loss, 1936; 1937.
4 6BBC, Profit and Loss, 1937.
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Expansion by national breweries also precipitated a 
growth of large local breweries into regional producers.
Sicks-Rainier, Hamms, Olympia, Coors, Schmidt, Ruppert, 
and numerous other breweries saw little future as giants 
of the industry gained an ever increasing share of the 
market. Consequently, they extended operations into 
several states. Small firms, which could neither afford / 
to meet competition or grow, closed almost as.rapidly as 
they had opened after repeal. In 1935, 750 breweries ; 
operated in the United States. By 1937, the number had 
fallen to 700.47
Troubles of the small firms were exacerbated in 1936
by another technological breakthrough--canned beer. Cans
were cheaper than glass, stored in less space, and were
expendable--breweries no longer had to pay freight rates
on empties. This development further reduced the produc-
4. R *tion cost of Eastern beer. ° By 1938, glass corporations 
retaliated with one-way bottles. ’’Glass cans,” made of a 
low quality material, were readily acceptable to the drink­
ing public.49
Expansion, canned beer, one-way bottles, and lower 
production costs found many breweries economically too
47"Shifts in Beer Picture,” Business Week, July 17, 1948, 
p p . 70-73. -
48"Beer Into Cans,” Fortune, January, 1936, pp. 75 ff.
49"One Trip Beer Bottle,” Business Week, Sept. 23, 1939, 
p . 32.
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small to meet mass production competition.^ With the con­
tinued mortality of breweries year after year, it became 
more apparent that success required sufficient capital, an 
excellent product, extensive advertising, efficient pro­
duction, wide distribution, and sound management. Lacking 
even one of these qualities could prove financially dis- 
as trous.
This was particularly true in the case of the Billings 
Brewery where none of the qualities were present; yet Art 
Trenerry would not accept the reality that the brewery was 
in serious difficulty. I t  had become a part of his life, 
and so he persisted in the belief that the plant had to be 
kept open by whatever means possible,‘including giving away 
merchandise to prevent the loss of distributors, and/or 
declaring dividends to placate stockholders. Thus, in 1938, 
1940, and 1941 the Billings Brewery paid dividends totaling 
$24,000.51 Adding to the 1936 dividend, this meant the loss 
of $39,000 in working c a p i t a l . ^2
S^In many areas Anheuser-Busch gained control of the 
draught beer market by selling Budweiser beer for $13.35 per 
barrel. When Busch initiated this policy, the price was 
twenty-two cents -less than the cost to manufacture Old 
Fashion. See "King of Bottle Beer," p. 42. BBC, Profit 
and Loss, 1935.
5 1Stockholder*s Meetings, June 6 , 1938; June 4, 1940; 
June 3, 1941, BBC, Minutes.
r O During these years absolutely no money was invested in 
property rentals which, throughout the brewery’s history,
42
The 6 per cent dividend of 1941 was especially incom­
prehensible. Barrel beer sales amounted to only 5829 
barrels, or a decline of 64 per cent since 1934.^ Further­
more, Trenerry knew the brewery would operate at a loss 
because the federal government raised the beer tax an 
additional one dollar per barrel for defense.
Despite bank and auditor warnings, it would appear 
that both Trenerry and Wise honestly believed the corpora­
tion was solvent. Both purchased stock whenever possible. 
Ray Wise considered Trenerry and himself as extremely 
sensible in operating the brewery. Answering a 1940 
thank you note from a grateful stockholder, Wise noted 
that while most breweries "had more or less tough sleding 
[sic]...," he was happy the Billings firm had been able 
to declare a d i v i d e n d . W i s e  continued: "Most of the
failures I understand were due to inexperience and the 
extension of ruthless credits. In this respect we 
[Trenerry and Wise] have been more than ultra-conserva-
returned each year to the corporation several times the 
income of the brewery. See Profit,and Loss Statements, 
1933-1968, BBC, Profit and Loss.
*^BBC, Profit and Loss, 1 9 3 4 r l 9 4 1 .
^special Stockholder's Meeting, December 16, 1941,
BBC, Minutes.
^Letter, Ray Wise to Julies E. Smith, October 12,
1940, BBC.
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tive...."5^
Between 1 9 3 3  and 1 9 4 0  Trenerry increased his holdings 
from four to more than 1 7 0  s h a r e s . 5? Perhaps Trenerry 
pursuaded himself that weather accounted for poor sales.
At almost every stockholder meeting after 1 9 3 6  he referred 
to weather as a detrimental factor to the sale of b e e r . 58 
Trenerry even wrote the weather bureau to obtain daily 
reports.59
Whatever Trenerry's explanation for poor beer sales,
r /:Ibid. In the same letter Wise reminded Smith that 
the number of breweries in operation dropped to only 5 8 2  
the past year. Within a year Wise wrote to several whole­
salers asking them to pay past due bills amounting to 
$ 2 , 6 0 0 .  Source: Letters to numerous wholesalers and re­
tailers. See General Correspondence, Billings Brewing 
Company, University of Montana Archives, Billings Brewing 
Company Papers.
r n^'In 1 9 3 9 ,  even, though a bank warned the corporation 
that its financial stability was questionable, Trenerry 
continued to purchase stock. Arthur Mueller, son of the 
brewery's founder, sold his remaining stock in the corpora­
tion at $ 1 2 5  per share. Both Trenerry and Wise, who 
eventually purchased most of the stock, were upset at his 
action because they felt the price was too low. Wise, through 
a friend in Missoula, learned why the Metals Bank and Trust 
Company of Butte, Mueller's trustee, released the stock for 
that price. A banker from Metals attended a director's 
meeting and perused the profit and loss statements. The 
Butte firm concluded that "...the Billings Brewing Company 
was losing ground and not progressing...." They reached 
this conclusion when they noted that even though the corpora­
tion paid dividends in 1 9 3 6 ,  the brewery closed their books 
in 1 9 3 7  showing "...the brewery had lost some $ 1 4 , 0 0 0 . "
Letter, Metals Bank and Trust Company to Mrs. Albert 
Rochester, September 9 ,  1 9 3 9 ,  BBC.
58stockholder's Meeting, 1 9 3 6  ff. BBC, Minutes.
59Letter, Art Trenerry to L.A. Warren, Dec. 1 4 ,  1 9 4 0 ,  BBC.
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the brewery continued in an ever worsening financial situa­
tion. The firm was still in debt, sales were poor, and 
equipment began to show signs of deterioration. Also, 
property rentals of the corporation were forty years old, 
and the future presupposed heavy expenses for repairs.
Wartime prosperity and restraints benefitted the 
small producer. Beer cans vanished, distilled alcohol 
was restricted, and limited transportation meant larger 
quantities of local beer could be sold over Eastern brands. 
The respite for the small producer lasted several years,1' 
but once the war ended it would take more than weather 
reports to explain away a brewery*s problems.
CHAPTER XV
WARTIME BOOM, PEACETIME BUST
At the 1 9 4 2  Stockholder’s Meeting Art Trenerry, as in 
years past, blamed weather conditions for poor business."*" 
There was little to be optimistic about for increased taxes 
on beer, as a result of the war, coupled to further increases 
in production costs, foreshadowed another year operating at 
a loss.. Trenerry voiced the hope that ..war emergencies 
and the like would not upset business in general.”2 His 
statement was really an expression of fear that war condi­
tions would further disrupt business, since ’’business in 
general” could not have been much worse. In 1 9 4 2 ,  the 
loss for the brewery amounted to approximately $1 1 0 0 .^
-^■Stockholder’s Meeting, February 1 0 ,  1 9 4 2 ,  BBC,' Minutes.
2 Ibid.
3 BBC, Profit and Loss, 1 9 4 2 .  Even the introduction 
two years previous of another lighter beer, Billings Pale, 
seemed to have little effect on business. Although the 
beer was well received by the public, profits continued 
to decline. Brewery records indicate the new beer was a 
better seller than Old Fashion, yet the brewery produced 
Pale only for package consumption. The Billings Brewery 
continued to supply Old Fashion in draught to bars. An 
indication of the public’s acceptance of Billings Pale was 
revealed in a complimentary letter by B.R. Albin, executive 
of the prominent Billings merchandise firm, Hart-Albin Com­
pany. Albin, in an ebullient mood, wrote the brewery's 
leaders a short poem explaining his feelings about Billings 
Pale. Calling his verse Billings "Pale Brew” versus
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"War emergencies and the like," however, offered the Billings 
Brewery and other small producers a reprive from extinction. 
Wartime restrictions placed on the industry favored small 
breweries over larger plants, and for several years there­
after these producers saw production and sales records 
double and triple from one.year to the next. Tin, steel, 
and aluminum, important for beer cans and barrels, vanished 
from the market. The loss of metal was especially detri­
mental to many national breweries which, by 1942, had 
invested heavily in beer cans. Beer bottles were still 
available, but caps had to be made of paper.4 As paper 
shortages occurred, production slowed for lack of both 
caps and labels. Early in the war government control boards 
placed grains on a prohibitory list.^ Grain restrictions
Peddling "The Bull," Albin wrote:
As a Bullfighter of rank/B.R. is no show
Armillita stole his stuff Three years ago.
But! As a Thrower of Bull!/I thought he ranked tops
7Til along came Ray Wise/And knocked out his props.
Then! Along came Trenerry adding insult to injury
By increasing Pop's waistline/That1s never been slendery,
B.R.'s Decision: The New Billings "Pale Brew"
Now! I am of the opinion "YOU REALLY HAVE GOT SOMETHING" 
Letter, B.R. Albin to Billings Brewing Company, undated, BBC.
4"Beers Bottlenecks," Business Week, May 2, 1942, p. 19.
^"Embattled Beer,” Business Week, November 24, 1945, 
p. 42.
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were especially advantageous to small breweries since the 
distilled alcohol industry depended on these cereals for 
their existence. With a shortage of distilled alcohol, 
many whiskey drinkers either had to go without or accept 
beer as a substitute. As the war progressed, the govern­
ment tightened rations on barley, a prime ingredient which, 
like yeast, determines the alcoholic content of the beer.^ 
Those breweries using a great quantity of barley either /
reduced the alcoholic content of the beer or curtailed * 
production.
Besides the problem of production, national and ex­
panded regional breweries continually faced a distribution 
crises. The railroad industry, burdened with troop trains 
and war material, denied many Eastern firms as easy access 
to their markets.^ The federal government required 15 per 
cent of all beer produced be sent overseas for the armed 
forces. Because of federal standards, national plants 
supplied the military since they manufactured large 
quantities of beer in a uniform quality.^ The law assured 
national breweries a ready market, but diverted thousands 
of gallons of beer from civilian consumers.
^"Brewer's Worry," Business Week, June 3, 1944, p. 48.
^Somc breweries owned fleets of trucks which stood idle 
during the war because of rations on gasoline and tires. In 
some areas breweries eliminated at least one day a week from 
their delivery schedule. "Beers Bottlenecks," p. 19.
^"Embattled Beer," p. 42.
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Finally, general wartime prosperity increased the 
profits of all small breweries. Across the nation, sales 
and production records set all time highs. The Billings 
Brewery was no exception. Within one year the brewery 
turned a 1942 $1100 loss into a $15,000 profit.^ This 
difference was the result of an increase in the produc­
tion and price of beer. Sales on both barrel and bottle f 
beer rose by more than 9 per cent between 1942 and 1943. 
Also, the brewery increased the price of beer by 11 per ■ 
c e n t . 1 0' increases in price and sales continued at approxi­
mately the same rate through 1944. However, for the next 
three years, the price for Old Fashion Beer rose by more 
than 22 per cent over the 1942 figure. Sales showed a 
spectacular increase as well. By 1947, barrel sales 
surpassed 7573 barrels, and bottle sales reached 168,572 
cases, or an increase of approximately 50 per cent since 
1942.11 Profits during these auspicious days exceeded 
$42,000 in 1945, and by 1947, almost doubled--in reaching 
$80,000.12
The war years must have been perfect beer drinking
^BBC, Profit and Loss, 1942, 1943.
lQlbid.
llBBC, Profit and Loss, 1942-1947.
l^BBC, Profit and Loss, 1947.
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weather for Trenerry never mentioned climatic conditions 
as having any affect on sales. Instead, with impressive 
profit and sales figures to underscore his words, Trenerry 
proclaimed to the stockholders that "... everything on the 
whole was in very satisfactory shape," for the corporation 
was "...in excellent financial condition."13 Trenerry 
could point out that the original debt was paid, profits 
were increasing, and sales had doubled over a six-year 
period.
Yet, behind the veneer Trenerry painted, it was easy 
to realize the foundation for his bombastic phraseology 
was a tenous one. For, only Trenerry's prodigality ex­
ceeded his optimism. As rapidly as profits were received 
from the beer, Trenerry converted the cash into dividends 
and returned it to the stockholders. Between September 
of 1942 and December of 1947 a total of seventy dollars on 
each share of stock was paid. This amounted to approxi­
mately $70,000 in income.14 During these same years the 
net income of the brewery after taxes amounted to
■^Stockholder’s Meetings, 1943-1947, BBC, Minutes.
•^Dates on which dividends were declared: September 16, 
1942, $10; October 6 , 1943, $12; July 17, 1944, $6 ; June 12, 
1945, $6 ; December 11, 1945; $8 ; June 18, 1946; $6 ; Decem­
ber 14, 1946, $8 ; June 12, 1947; $6 ; December 3, 1947,
$8 . Stockholder’s and Board of Director's Meetings, 1942 
ff., BBC, Minutes.
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$161,875.66.15 Thus, Trenerry returned 43 per cent of 
the brewery's income as dividends. Trenerry saved nothing 
for plant repairs or property improvement. Most of the 
equipment existed with only minor renovations since 1900.
Due to the lack of improvements, brewery property deter­
iorated at a rapid rate. Many structures were, like the
(
brewery, fifty years old. Without the necessary funds for 
refurbishment they rented for far less than their value.
Trenerry's exubrance over the increase in sales and 
profits was short sighted. Little consideration was given 
to postwar competition. Only a slight perusal of brewery 
records was necessary to determine a rise in production 
costs and taxes paralleled an increase in profits. A 
slow but steady rise in the cost of production, added to 
a burgeoning federal tax, increased the outlay for pro­
ducing beer approximately 12 per cent. That is, the cost 
of manufacturing beer after the war was $1.91 more on 
every thirty-one gallons when compared to 1942.-^
Some stockholders began to realize before the war ended 
that the corporation was not in "excellent financial condi­
tion.” As early as 1942, S.G. Tonkin, a stockholder elected 
to the perfunctory position of vice-president, assailed
15BBC, Profit and Loss, 1942-1947.
1 6 Ibid.
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Trenerry's action of paying dividends while the brewery 
lost money. Tonkin's dissention finally led to the vice- 
president's resignation in 1944, and the selling of his 
shares of stock in the brewery.17 The resignation of 
Tonkin, however, did not end criticism of Trenerry. In 
fact, Trenerry's halcyon days of leadership were drawing 
to a close. In the following year, 1945, Ray Wise died, 
leaving behind a lifetime of service to the Billings 
Brewery.18 Francis B. Welsh, brewery office manager before 
the war, assumed Wise's duties. Welsh held a more objec­
tive view of the corporation's financial difficulties 
than either Trenerry or Wise were capable of accepting. 
Although from the East, Welsh spent most of his life in 
Billings. The knowledge he gained from several business 
enterprises during the 1930's brought a realist to the 
staff of Trenerry's fantasyland. Welsh realized in 1940 
that property rentals were a more lucrative source of 
income than a parasitic brewery. Thus, when he returned 
from service in the Navy, Welsh began to garner support 
among stockholders toward his point of view.
Wartime prosperity muffled Welsh's criticism of 
Trenerry. Yet, even in 1945 it was apparent to stock-
1^Stockholder's Meeting, February 8 , 1944, BBC, Minutes.
18BG, August 13, 1945.
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holders, who bothered to investigate the brewery, that 
Trenerry’s euphonious words rang hollow. Everything on 
the whole was not "in very satisfactory shape" for the 
brewery was in complete disrepair. The brewery manufac­
tured an ever increasing amount of unsalable beer. "Poor 
carbonation, sour taste, unpleasant odor, and foreign 
matter in the beer" became a daily headache for brewery 
employees as they poured hundreds of gallons of Old Fashion 
beer into the sewer.19 gy 1947 brewing vats had so 
deteriorated, and the amount of beer destroyed reached such 
an alarming rate, that at the end of the year all vats 
were drained, cleaned and revarnished. However, the worthy 
venture proved disasterous. Lastiglass, the synthetic 
thinner applied by the brewers, had not dried properly before 
a new brew was manufactured. The beer absorbed the varnish 
off the vats, and, before the brewery realized what had 
happened, it was shipped to markets where customers received 
Old Fashion with a less than enthusiastic reception.20 Once 
the brewery rectified the problem, the purpose of cleaning 
the vats came to naught since employees destroyed just as 
much beer after the 1948 debacle. Foreign matter and other
19See General Correspondence, Billings Brewing Com­
pany, University of Montana Archives, Billings Brewing 
Company Papers.
^Stockholder’s Meeting, February 10, 1948, BBC, Minutes.
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the brewery rectified the problem, the purpose of cleaning 
the vats came to naught since employees destroyed just as 
much beer after the 1948 debacle. Foreign matter and other
l^See General Correspondence, Billings Brewing Com­
pany, University of Montana Archives, Billings Brewing 
Company Papers.
^Stockholder's Meeting, February 10, 1948, BBC, Minutes.
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abnormalities were still present.21
The criticism leveled at the brewery by stockholders 
following the varnish episode intensified after 1948. In 
that year, wartime prosperity ended almost as abruptly as 
it began. National and expanded regional breweries en­
trenched for a sales battle which threatened to "drown all
2 2 1but the strongest swimmers in their own beer." As the 
government lifted wartime controls, multimillion dollar 
corporations like Anheuser-Busch and Joseph Schlitz built 
second or third plants on various sites across the nation
21ln August of 1950, the brewery destroyed 5952 gallons 
of beer because of "foreign matter" in the beer and poor 
carbonation. Letter, F.B. Welsh to H. Van Haverbeke,
August 14, 1950, BBC. On November 21, 1950 a Libel of Infor­
mation was filed, and a Warrant of Arrest issued against the 
Billings Brewery in violation of the 1938 Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act. Forty-five hundred pounds of barley 
malt, and sixteen hundred pounds of barley flakes were found 
to be "stored in unsanitary conditions, and they consist 
wholly or in part of a filthy substance... rodent excrete 
and insects in the barley malt, rodent pellets, and rodent 
urine in and on the Brewer's flakes; and said articles have 
been held under unsanitary conditions whereby they may have 
been contaminated with filth." Warrant of Arrest to Billings 
Brewing Company, November 21, 1950, University of Montana 
Archives, Billings Brewing Company Papers. On November 28, 
1950 the brewery appeared in U.S. District Court in Billings 
to plead guilty. However, the court dismissed the case the 
following day because the brewery destroyed the barley malt 
and barley flakes. United States, Libelant v. 4500 Pounds 
Bulk Barley Malt and Sixteen Bags each containing 100 Pounds 
of an Article Labeled in part "Jiffymalt Brewers Flakes" 
Libelees, Civil 1278, U.S. Q 9 5 0 ) . [Since this case was dis­
missed, information was found on court docket at U.S. Court 
in Great Falls].
22"Budweiser East," Business Week, January 27, 1945,
p . 8 2 .
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to compliment their original brewery'. Within a few years 
Newark, Los Angeles, Houston, and San Francisco produced 
as much beer as the original brewing capital, Milwaukee.23
Competition from other breweries rose sharply for the 
Billings plant during 1948. Before the year closed, sales 
fell more than 28 per cent, or 150,000 gallons from the 
preceding y e a r . 24 Although barrel beer sold at a loss, 
bottle sales were still sufficient to show a profit that 
year. However, the 1948 profit on the brewery, $19,686.58, 
was $61,570.81 less than 1947 profits.25 Income fell by 
more than 75 per cent in one year, yet this drastic re­
versal in business did not deter Trenerry from recommending 
that dividends be paid. His persuasiveness over a majority 
of the stockholders, who failed to realize that ,the great 
profits of the preceding years were only a consequence of 
the war, delivered to Trenerry the support necessary to 
declare a dividend and continue his program. Thus, in 1948, 
the corporation returned fourteen dollars on each share of
^ T h e  continual failure of breweries in the United States 
is reflected in the loss of sales by small plants to the 
expanding avaricious giants. Of the 530 breweries operating 
in 1941, by 1947 only( 464 remained. Between the years 1947 
and 1948 thirty-nine more breweries closed. "Shifts in the 
Beer Picture," Business Week, July 17, 1948, pp. 70-72.
^BEC, Profit and Loss, 1948.
25b b C, Profit and Loss, 1948.
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stock.^
In 1949, at the stockholder's meeting, Trenerry never 
bothered to discuss the 1948 reversal. Instead, he reminded 
stockholders of the past year's dividend. Trenerry believed 
what was necessary for the Billings Brewery to again gain a 
preponderance of the local beer market was to begin canning 
beer. Thus, the 1949 meeting was devoted to "what might be 
expected in the coming year."27 What might be expected was 
heavy outlays for new equipment. Although some stockholders 
might object to the expenses involved in canning beer, 
Trenerry tentatively planned to purchase machinery so the 
process would be ready by 1950.
Trenerry, quixotic and unyielding, would not listen to 
critics. He borrowed money to pay for the 1948 dividends.
In 1949, the corporation moved deeper into debt as Trenerry 
received another loan to buy new canning and refrigeration 
equipment , as well as pay for another dividend-- twelve 
dollars a s h a r e . ^8 The brewery had to be kept open at 
whatever the price, for Trenerry could not accept the 
failure of a lifetime of effort. Yet, by his actions, the
^Board of Director's Meetings, May 31, 1948; Decem­
ber 2, 1948, BBC,. Minutes.
27Stockholder*s Meeting, February 8 , 1949, BBC, Minutes.
^Special Stockholder's Meeting, December 5, 1949, BBC, 
Minutes.
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corporation was rapidly approaching bankruptcy. As Trenerry 
tried to buy stockholder support with dividends, beer pro­
fits and sales continued to fall. In 1949, beer sales 
dropped approximately 24 per cent, or 129,000 gallons less 
than the preceding year, while profits plummeted to $2,400, 
or a 94 per cent decrease since 1947.^9
At the 19 50 stockholder's meeting Trenerry could only 
ask for time. He promised stockholders that canned beer 
equipment, which would be operable in the spring, would 
increase sales, while the new refrigeration units and other 
machinery the brewery purchased would cut labor c o s t s . 30 
The year 1950 was Trenerryfs onus probandi [burden of proof]. 
Impatient stockholders were in no mood to make allowances 
any longer. Trenerry?s views, which held sway for sixteen 
years, were now in the minority. Criticism of his leader­
ship reached crescendo proportion. Stockholders would not 
be satisfied with simplistic explanations if profits were 
not forthcoming.
In January of 1951, Trenerry received the Profit and 
Loss statement from the brewery's accountants, Colburg and 
Wallin. Its few pages proved his theories on canned beer 
and new refrigeration to have been a will-o'-the-wisp.
29b b C, Profit and Loss, 1949.
^Stockholder's Meeting, February 4, 1950, BBC,
Minutes.
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Colburg and Wallin reported a loss for the year in excess 
of $59,000. On the beer alone, the accountants listed 
losses at $27,000.31 Instead of an increase as Trenerry 
had predicted, sales fell 46 per cent below 1949. Pro­
duction costs reached an all time high because of the 
expensive tin beer cans. The Billings Brewery, to sell 
beer at a competitive price in 1950, lost $6.33 on each 
barrel. Each case of bottle beer sold at 53<f: .below cost 
to distributors, while canned beer wholesaled at $1.09 
less than, production c o s t . 33 The accountants noted that 
to be able to realize a profit from canned beer, it would 
be necessary to obtain a volume of 120,000 cases or more.
In 1950, total beer sales of both cans and bottles amounted 
to only 48,872 cases.34
On February 13, 1951, stockholders assembled in the 
Billings Brewing Company offices for the annual meeting. 
Trenerry, in presenting the auditor’s report to the con­
clave, dismissed it in total as an "unfair r e p o r t . "35 
Instead, he made a prepared statement of his own on the
31BBC, Profit and Loss, 1950.
5 2 Ibid.
53rbjd.
34lbid.
^Stockholder's Meeting, February 13, 1951, BBC, Minutes.
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condition of business. In a concise review, Trenerry 
offered three reasons why the Billings Brewery’s sales 
were bad during 1950: ’’One, the weather was poor--this
resulted in poor sales. Two, the Billings Brewing Company 
was late getting into the canned beer business--thus caus­
ing a loss in sales. Three, trouble with the beer itself."36 
Although none present would argue with his last reason, 
stockholders were not ready to listen to Trenerry expound 
on the weather. Almost immediately Frank Jacoby, a stock­
holder, interrupted Trenerry. Jacoby tersely noted that 
there seemed to be "plenty of beer business,” but the 
Billings Brewery was not "getting much of the business.” 37
Jacoby’s comments incited a tumultuous uproar among 
the stockholders. Thereafter followed a lengthy discussion 
covering the plethora of problems the brewery faced. The 
debate culminated in the proposition that a new board of 
directors be nominated. Stockhblders designated Francis 
Welsh and Mrs. Olga Wise, wife of the late secretary- 
treasurer, as president and secretary-treasurer. David 
Magowan, another stockholder, received the necessary support 
for vice-president.
^Stockholder’s Meeting, February 13, 1951, BBC, Minutes.
5 7 Ibid.
3 8Ibid,
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Trenerry1 warned the assemblage that he was a director 
and thus had to hold one of the offices denied him. He 
suggested the meeting be called off until a later date.
When all stockholders refused his suggestion, Trenerry 
polled the corporation's members to determine if he con­
trolled the sufficient votes to remain as a director.
Trenerry owned, or held by proxy, 265 shares of s t o c k . ^9 
By the corporation's by-laws, the number was adequate for 
Trenerry to demand a directorship. Stockholders then agreed 
to Trenerryfs demand, but stipulated that he could work only 
in conjunction with Welsh and Wise. The triumverate would 
serve as equals until they decided among themselves who 
would become president. Trenerry agreed to this plan. ‘When 
the board of directors met after the stockholder's meeting, 
however, Trenerry refused to attend, and instead walked o u t . 40 
Welsh and Wise nominated each other, working without Trenerry. 
Welsh accepted the presidency, while IVIrs. Wise became 
secretary-treasurer. They designated Trenerry, although 
absent, vice-president. Immediately Welsh and Wise resolved 
that only they would henceforth sign the corporation's 
c h e c k s . 41 Welsh indicated his first duty would be to survey
^stockholder ’ s Meeting, February 13, 1951, BBC, Minutes.
40goard of Director’s Meeting, February 13, 1951, BBC, 
Minutes.
4 1 I b i d .
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the brewery and its property, for the purpose of compiling 
a report to be presented to the stockholders.
Within a month Welsh determined that if the brewery 
was to continue producing beer, the first order of business 
was to stop brewing Old Fashion, since ’’Old Fashion was not 
very highly regarded with the p u b l i c . " 4 2  Employees drained 
all vats, and an entirely new beer, much lighter in taste, 
was made available for consumers. In the summer of 1951 
Billings Tap Beer reached the markets. Although the beer 
received many compliments, Welsh found "...considerable 1 
resistance was being experienced because of the past adverse 
reputation of the b r e w e r y . "^3 Thus, in December of 1951, 
Welsh notified stockholders of a special meeting to 
determine the future course of the corporation. Trenerry, 
who previously refused to attend earlier board of director 
meetings, sat in attendance but remained silent.44
Welsh reminded stockholders of his previous intention 
to investigate the corporation. After an exhaustive study, 
he thought it imperative to review his findings in order
4^Board 0f DirectorTs Meeting, March 28, 1951, BBC, 
Minutes.
43goard of Director's Meeting, July 11, 1951, BBC, 
Minutes.
44por both the March and July board meetings Trenerry 
received registered letters informing him of the conference. 
On the second occasion, it was determined that if Trenerry 
would not attend, the corporation would institute legal pro­
ceedings to remove him. See Board of Director's Meetings, 
March 28, 1951, July 11, 1951, BBC, Minutes.
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to consider what policy the corporation should implement. 
Welsh, who began by discussing the corporation's 19 50 
financial condition, underscored his review with a resume 
provided by the accountants, Colburg and Wallin. The firm, 
Welsh advised his audience, listed brewery assets at 
$74,305.14, but approximately 87 per cent of those assets 
were inventory.45 Current liabilities, including bank 
drafts made against the brewery, overdrafts, cash advance- 
ments, and sundry taxes and interest amounted to $60,494^12.
On approximately $46,000 of that amount, the brewery paid 
5 per cent annual interest.46
In considering why the brewery operated at such a 
great loss, Welsh felt it was due to the unfavorable stigma 
attached to Old Fashion Beer. He recalled how, on past 
Christmases, it had been the practice to give cases of 
Old Fashion to friends and customers. However, over the 
holiday season of 1950, recipients of the favor "...thought 
the brewery had a poor batch of beer to dispose of and 
unloaded it on them as Christmas presents."4? Old Fashion,
4%elsh Manuscript. [On microfilm following the Billings 
Brewing Company Minutes], University of Montana Archives, 
Billings Brewing Company Papers. Hereinafter referred to 
as Welsh Manuscript, BBC.
^^Welsh Manuscript, BBC.
4 7Ibid.
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Welsh continued, was a "distinct liability. In meeting 
the public Welsh found customers asking "for anything but 
Old Fashion. In fact, we encountered as much opposition 
to our brand name as we did to any single element. Our 
Old Fashion Beer, in a solid green can, was commonly 
referred to as 'Green Death'.
To overcome Old Fashion's reputation, Welsh reminded ' 
his listeners, the brewery introduced Tap Beer. Welsh felt 
the results were gratifying. The State Fair even accepted 
the new' local product "where in years past Old Fashion had 
received so many complaints, the fair board granted other 
breweries the rights to our c o n c e s s i o n . H o w e v e r ,  the 
efforts came to naught since a lack of money prevented 
sufficient advertising and distribution of Tap Beer. Welsh 
found some distributors carrying a Western beer that sold 
well, and they would not change brands; while others, who 
would buy Tap Beer, did not want to pay the price which the 
Billings Brewery c h a r g e d . ^1 Because of the uncertainty of
48lbid.
4 9 Ibid.
5QIbid.
94The term "Western" beer designates a beer produced in 
the Western United States. Until Eastern firms built breweries 
across the United States, beer shipped from Milwaukee and other 
"Eastern" points sold at a higher price because they were con­
sidered to be of a better quality than Western beers. Today, 
some Milwaukee based breweries still price their beer a few 
cents higher, even though the product might have been produced 
on the West coast.
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the corporation's future, Welsh noted, the head brewmaster 
accepted a position with a more solvent organization.52
Turning to the problems of the corporation as a whole, 
Welsh found rentals had not kept apace of the times. Profits 
for ten years previous were well above $6,000, while in 1951 
these same holdings furnished an income of less than $4,400.53 
Insurance on almost all buildings was inadequate, and many' 
were in need of repairs--but no funds were available. Pre­
senting Colburg and Wallin's statistics covering sixteen' 
years of business, Welsh pointed out that the corporation 
earned $160,000 after taxes. Of the amount, Trenerry returned 
approximately $140,000 as dividends.54
Finally, Welsh reminded stockholders of the difficulties 
the Billings Brewery faced in competition with well-financed 
organizations. The firm lacked the capital to repair brewery 
equipment, and, if the brewery continued using the deterio­
rating machinery, the cost of production would remain too 
high. In drawing his prepared statement to a close, Welsh 
expressed the opinion that three alternatives were possible 
for the corporation:
52welsh Manuscript, BBC.
SSjbid,
54ibid.
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1. Vote enough money- to pay off the present 
indebtedness of $70,000 and provide working 
capital in the amount of $30,000. To raise this 
amount of money it will be necessary to place a 
mortgage on the property.
2. Vote sufficient money to liquidate the 
present indebtedness, provide working capital, 
and provide funds to replace obsolete equipment 
in use today. This plan will necessitate a loan 
of approximately $2 0 0 ,0 0 0 . It is our opinion 
that it will take at least $1 00,000 to put this 
plant in condition whereby we can produce 
competitively.
3. Vote sufficient money to pay off the 
present indebtedness. Close the brewery, 
operate the rental property.55
After a lengthy discussion, stockholders agreed to the 
third plan. To this end, they resolved to immediately close 
the brewery and borrow $70,000 to eradicate the d e b t . 5 6  
Trenerry, who sat quietly throughout the proceedings, arose 
and left. The following day Trenerry mailed the brewery 
his resignation as a director "to become effective at the 
time this notice is d e l i v e r e d . . . . "57
Trenerryfs fight to maintain the brewery had ended, but 
Welsh’s battle to return the corporation to solvency had 
only begun. The most immediate task was to secure a loan 
and dispose of the brewery. As events transpired, Welsh 
found it easier to borrow extensive sums of money than to 
divest the corporation from the brewery. In March of 1952,
55special Stockholder's Meeting, December 10, 1951, 
BBC, Minutes.
5 6 i b i d .
57tetter, Art Trenerry to Billings Brewing Company, 
December 11, 1951, BBC, Minutes.
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Welsh procurred $70,000 from Alberta Bair and Marguerita 
Lamb, of Martinsdale, Montana.^ agreement reached
called for repayment of the loan over ten years, in 120 
monthly installments, at 5 per cent per annum interest.59 
With the necessary funds, Welsh began paying all the debts 
incurred by the brewery, as well as repairing and refurbish­
ing many of the buildings owned by the corporation. In 
1953 alone, Welsh spent $27,000 for property renovations.^ 
The efforts proved fruitful, for, in 1953, the corporation 
operated at a profit. Welsh advised stockholders that 
"...we have a long, hard road before we have our house in 
order, but we are headed in the right d i r e c t i o n . W e l s h ' s  
predictions proved true for, by the end of the decade, rent 
receipts were high and stockholders received dividends 
regularly.
Finding some use for the brewery building, however, 
occupied more time than it was worth. The building, archaic 
and in disrepair, had little use for any other line of 
business. No one wanted to buy the structure and its equip­
ment, or reopen the brewery. For several years Welsh was
S^Board of Director's Meeting, March 13, 1952, BBC, • 
Minutes.
SOxbicL
^Stockholder's Meeting, February 9, 1954, BBC, Minutes.
^stockholder's Meeting, February 10, 1953, BBC, Minutes.
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unsuccessful in selling or renting the edifice. Exasperated, 
the corporation’s president began receiving estimates for 
tearing down the three story monolith, but rejected all 
offers as being too costly--at least $12,000.62 Finally, 
in 1959, Welsh readily accepted a contract from an individual 
who offered to demolish the brewery for $6,500. The agree­
ment provided that all ,salvagable materials and machinery ; 
would go to the contractor.63 As it turned out, the brewery, 
which cost the. corporation great sums of money while in ■ 
operation, denied stockholders any recompense upon its 
demise. A short time after the contractor began wrecking 
operations, the lengthy national steel strike of 1959 began. 
Consequently, the fifty steel beams comprising the skeltal 
structure of the building and much of the machinery in dis­
repair were sold at a premium price by the contractor.64
For Welsh, however, the difficulties surrounding dis­
posal of the brewery were pale in comparison to the vexations 
presented by Trenerry's obstreperous attitude. To all but 
Trenerry, the brewery soon became a bad memory. Trenerry 
could not accept this view. Closure evoked bitter antagonism,
62goard of Director’s Meeting, April 23, 1954, BBC, Minutes.
6 ^Board of Director’s Meeting, September 18, 1959, BBC, 
Minutes.
64conversation w ith F.B. Welsh by the author, Novem­
ber 27, 1969, Billings, Montana.
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and for several years Trenerry held Welsh personally respon* 
sible for the termination of brewing operations. Trenerry, 
to the embarrasment of all, returned to the stockholder 
meetings only to criticize Welsh aad vent his feelings. In 
February of 1954, two years after the brewery closed,
Trenerry reappeared. Once Welsh finished his report on 
business showing the corporation’s rents had increased by ! 
$18,270, or 49 per cent over the previous year, Trenerry 
urged stockholders that Welsh should not have been allowed 
to collect the r e n t s . ^5 Trenerry claimed that, at the 1951 
meeting, stockholders agreed that after the brewery’s sale­
able equipment was disposed of, an agency would assume rent 
c o l l e c t i o n . ^6 Welsh replied that he had not recalled such 
an agreement. He provided the minutes of the 1951 meeting, 
but Trenerry refused, to read them. Welsh then stated that 
Trenerry could make any motion he wished concerning the 
collection of rents, but Trenerry declined.6 ?
One year later Trenerry again brought up the question 
of rents. Welsh advised Trenerry he'” ...was at liberty to 
make any motion he so desired concerning this matter."^
^Stockholder’s Meeting, February 9, 1954, BBC, Minutes.
^Stockholder’s Meeting, February 9, 1954, BBC, Minutes.
^ ibid.
^Stockholder's Meeting, February 8, 19 55, BBC, Minutes.
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Trenerry retorted ’'[Welsh] didn’t know much about business, 
and all the stockholders were allowed to do was make 
s u g g e s t i o n s . ” ^  matter rested until Welsh reported on
the preceding year. In his statement, Welsh recalled 
” ...what a handicap this corporation worked under since so 
much money was needed for repairs,” and reminded stockholders 
that blame rested with the previous presidents practice of 
using profits for dividends.70 Almost immediately Trenerry 
stormed to his feet, shouting: ’’...the report is no good,” 
and that Welsh was ’’directly responsible for the closing of 
the brewery.”71 Trenerry then claimed the entire report was 
a ’’bunch of b u l l . ”72 pGr several minutes Trenerry’s tirade 
continued, using language ’’not recorded."^ Welsh replied 
that he wanted it known that ”he refused to argue with 
Trenerry.”74
In 1956, five years after the brewery closed, Trenerry 
again berated Welsh. Welsh presented a review of 1955, and 
pointed out that rent receipts amounted to $167,104.25, or a
6 9 Ibid.
7 0Ibid.
7 1 Ibid.
7 2Ibid.
7 %Stockholder’s Meeting, February 8 , 1955, BBC, Minutes.
7 4Ibid.
9 4 9  per cent increase oyer 1950.75 Trenerry dismissed 
Welsh’s statements, claiming ” ...the report might sound 
nice to some people, but to anyone who knows anything about 
business, it didn’t mean much. These rents would have gone 
up anyway.”76 Trenerry expressed the opinion that Welsh 
’’was getting too much money,” and, returning to the 1951 
stockholder’s meeting, questioned Welsh’s right to collect 
r e n t . W e l s h  angrily retorted that he was ’’...getting 
sick and tired of listening to this complaint every year....
If we would have listened to you [Trenerry] all these years 
we would still be getting only $ 1 7 , 6 0 5  per year in r e n t a l s . ” 7 8  
Welsh then wanted to know what salary Trenerry drew as corpora­
tion president. It was determined Trenerry received $ 3 5 0  
each month. Welsh queried Trenerry: "...you drew $ 3 5 0  per
month to run this business on an annual gross income of 
approximately $ 1 2 , 0 0 0  and yet you feel I’m getting an ex­
cessive salary at $ 4 0 0  per month with the income up over 
$ 4 0 , 0 0 0  per y e a r ? ” 7 9  Trenerry, who sold insurance, rejoined 
that he knew ”...an insurance agent who would do the same
7^Stockholder’s Meeting, February 1 4 ,  1 9 5 6 ,  B B C ,  Minutes.
7 6Xbjd.
77Ibid.
78Ibid.
^Stockholder's Meeting, February 14, 1956, BBC, Minutes.
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job for 5 per cent of the rent, receipts.1'^
Trenerry!s comment began a verbal barrage between 
Welsh and himself. Their words were recorded only as a 
’’heated discussion. Welsh finally protested that
’’...managing this company involved considerable more work 
than running around once a month to pick up a rent check,” 
for Welsh noted, ”it had taken quite a little work to rid
o 9the corporation of several tie-in gimmicks that existed...
He then added that the business was "now being operated only 
in the interests of the stockholders,” and that was the way 
it was going to continue to be run.^
Wise finally interrupted both Trenerry and Welsh, 
charging "...this line of conversation [is] accomplishing 
absolutely nothing," and voiced the opinion that the 
majority of the stockholders "were more than pleased with 
the progress of the c o m p a n y . T r e n e r r y  closed the argu­
ment claiming he "just wanted to state the minority’s 
opinion. "85
8QIbid.
8 1Ibid.
82 Ibid.
8 5Ibid.
8 4 Ibid.
8 5Ibid.
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Possibly' after 1956, Trenerry realized his voice was 
the "minority opinion,” and that his billingsgate and 
picayune criticism fell on deaf ears. A return to normalcy 
occurred at stockholders1 meetings. For the remainder of 
the decade Trenerry worked alongside Welsh without difficulty. 
Also, Trenerry might have come to accept Welsh's leadership. 
Under Welsh, dividends, became frequent. At the time of the 
brewery closure Trenerry. and his wife owned 250 shares of 
s t o c k . E v e n  when dividends were small, they received an 
adequate return to carry them through their senescence. 
Trenerry might have even realized that continuation of the 
brewery was economically impractical. During the 1950's, 
several of the other breweries in the state ceased opera­
tions. In 1959, three years before his death at eighty-one, 
Trenerry discussed these failures. He revealed how, on a 
trip to Missoula, Montana, he found the Butte Brewery in 
financial difficulty and planning to close. Trenerry further 
recalled that only two breweries remained in the state 
[Great Falls and Missoula], and reminded stockholders of
how the Billings Brewery faced the same economic problems
8 7of these remaining plants a decade earlier. '
Trenerry, in taking cognizance of the mortality rate
^Special stockholder's Meeting, December 10, 1951,
BBC, Minutes.
^Stockholder's Meeting, February 10, 1959, BBC, Minutes.
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for small breweries, might have eased his mind knowing many, 
of the problems of the Billings Brewery were attributable 
to economic causes and an advanced t e c h n o l o g y . For, in 
the years preceding and following the closure of the Billings 
Brewery, national breweries spread cancerously, leaving 
behind "...a battleground strewn with dead companies, the 
terrors of rising costs, and the traps of overcapacity."^ 
Between 1949 and 1969, the number of United States breweries 
in operation fell from above 400 to less than ninety, or a 
decline of approximately 87 per cent since 1933.^0 i n  their 
wake, the largest corporations expanded without limits, and 
acquired everything from defunct malt liquor plants to 
baseball teams. By 1969, three corporations--Anheuser-Busch, 
Schlitz, and Pabs t--claimed 37 per cent of the beer market. ̂  
Against such odds few small breweries could hope to
S^By 1968 all brewing in Montana ceased. Although "Great 
Falls" beer is still sold in Montana, a Portland, Oregon 
brewery has produced the malt beverage since 1968.
O Q "Keeping Your Head in the Beer Business," Business Week, 
September 13, 1969, pp. 138-142.
9 0 Ibld.
9 -*-Ibid. It has been estimated that within a decade ten 
breweries will control 90 per cent of the beer sales in the 
United States. Mass production provided the fuel for growth. 
For example, in one day Anheuser-Busch’s Budweiser plant in 
St. Louis, only one among many, can manufacture enough beer 
to fill 7,500,000 cans and almost 7,000,000 bottles. In 
1968, alone, Anheuser-Busch sold 18,400,000 barrels of beer. 
"Keeping Your Head," pp. 138-142.
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compete. Thus, in retrospect, the Billings Brewing Company 
became a statistic. Along with several hundred other small 
plants, the Billings firm closed its doors and was soon 
forgotten. The Billings Brewery, similar to a myriad of 
businesses of an earlier day, failed because of the age of 
enterprise in which the corporation existed, as much as the 
liabilities incurred in producing Old Fashion Beer. Yet, 
at the same time, the Billings Brewery was a product of the 
age of enterprise. It is only necessary to consider the’ 
corporation^ leader, Art Trenerry. He was unable to accept 
the idea that the Billings Brewery was a failure. More 
importantly, he was unable to recognize that much of the 
free enterprise system is a myth. Coming from Wales early 
in life, Trenerry might have been instilled with Horatio 
Alger ideals--to strive is to succeed. He gave the brewery 
his all, yet it was not a success. Trenerry's greatest 
failure, then, was his inability to realize that when operat­
ing in competition with rapacious corporations, the ideal 
and reality of free enterprise are completely separate.
A P P E N D I X
APPENDIX A: BOTTLE BEER
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APPENDIX B: BARREL BEER SALES (in 31-gallon kegs) OF BILLINGS BREWING COMPANY BEER 1913-1950* 
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APPENDTX C: BARREL BEER COST OF PRODUCTION, SALES PRICE, AND 
PROFIT OR LOSS ON BILLINGS BREWING COMPANY BEER, 1934-1950*
Barrel Beer 
(One 31-gallon
Barrel) 1934 1935 19 36 1937 1938 1939
Production Cost $4. 59 $5.04 $4. 76 $6 , 66 $5.35 $5.30
Federal Stamp tax 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
State Revenue tax .86 . 89 .87 . 86 . 85 .83
Selling+Delivery 1. 44 1. 83 1.91 2. 53 2.36 2 . 32
General Costs .67 . 81 .92 1.21 1.01 1.08
Total 12. 56 13. 57 13.46 1 6 . 26 14. 57 14. 53
Profit or Loss + 2.57 + 1.40 + 1.17 -1 . 26 + .32 + .36
Sales Price to
Wholesaler $15.13 $14.97 $14.63 $15.00 $14.89 $14.89
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Production Cost $5.40 $5.69 $6.16 $5.97 $6.47 $6.47
Federal Stamp tax 5.52 6.00 6.12 7.00 7. 74 8.00
State Revenue tax . 77 .78 . 75 .77 . 73 .65
Selling+Delivery 2.60 2.61 2.28 1. 79 1.37 1 . 20
General Costs .90 .96 .94 . 75 . 76 . 66
Total 15.19 16.04 16. 25 1 6 . 28 17.07 1 6 . 9S"
Profit or Loss + .06 -.32 - .50 + .65 + .89 + 1.01
Sales Price to
Wholesaler $15.26 $15.72 $15.75 $16.93 $17.96 $17.99
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950
Production Cost $6.02 $7.55 $ 8 . 7 8 $9. 21 $11.57
Federal Stamp tax 8.00 8.62 8.70 8 . 77# 8.84'
State Revenue tax .69
Selling+Delivery .91 1.37 / 2.01 2.52 4.65
General Costs .70 .62 . 86 1.08 1 . 86
Total 16. 32 18.16 20.35 21.58 26.92
Profit or Loss + 2.57 + .96 - .48 -1.00 -6.33
Sales Price to
Wholesaler $18.89 $19.22 $19.87 $20.58 $20.59
*Earlier records not available.
#Auditor’s Report combined Federal and State tax after 1946.
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